North Korea's second nuclear test on May 25 has once again brought further tension and instability to the Korean Peninsula. Despite repeated appeals by the international community to forego nuclear testing or the launching of a ballistic missile, North Korea went ahead in defiance, conducting yet another test.

The test once again highlighted how complicated the security situation on the Korean Peninsula has become.

The international community is now faced with an even greater sense of urgency to take appropriate measures after a decade of efforts by the U.S., South Korea and other allies in the region to bring North Korea to the negotiating table have thus far failed to produce any tangible results toward the goal of lasting peace and stability on the peninsula.

Among the many reasons for this failure, the foremost may well be the manner in which the U.S. has attempted to seek a ``patch-up'' solution for a deeply complicated situation.

Its insistence on solving the nuclear issue first at the cost of several other key issues may be seen to be at the root of the ongoing stand-off with the North Korean regime.

Viewing the nuclear issue in isolation from other matters affecting the peninsula has been a costly error in this international diplomatic effort.

The North Korea nuclear program is a consequence of an increasingly complicated situation involving numerous factors on the peninsula. Until and unless those factors are removed, the nuclear crisis simply cannot be solved.

Though the Cold War ended decades ago in other parts of the world, it continues on the Korean Peninsula. It appears to have a life of its own, with no relationship to the U.S.-Russia rivalry or to ideology. The local factors, which continually feed this environment, must be dealt with in order to end the Cold War here, too.

One continuing factor playing a major role is the lack of a formal ending of the Korean War. Despite the cessation of hostilities half a century ago, the two Koreas are still at war. Without a formal peace treaty between them, they have failed to trust each other.

This lack of a formal peace is reported to be the main reason why North Korea has refused to give up its nuclear weapons.

From their perspective, it is suicidal to give up weapons without any kind of peace treaty with the U.S. and its allies in light of the growing military strength of South Korea and increasing military threat from the U.S. and Japan.

North Koreans have been asking for a peace treaty with the United States since 1974. However, past U.S. administrations have failed to understand the strategic role such a peace treaty can play in ending the Cold War on the peninsula and instead keep ignoring the North Korea demand.

Even the Bush administration agreed to the provision for a peace treaty on September 19, 2005, very reluctantly.

The joint statement of the six-party talks proposed that ``related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum,'' implying that a peace treaty can be signed only if all the important issues plaguing both countries are solved.

These issues include North's nuclear and missile program, human rights issues in North Korea, conventional disarmament of the North Korean army, drugs and illegal currency trade and support for terrorism.

For now, North Korea still waits. According its official policy, all other issues can be solved easily once the mutual trust is established between the two parties through the peace treaty.

Since past U.S. policy of negotiating a nuclear program without a formal treaty is not succeeding, it will be worthwhile for the Obama administration to seriously consider it.

Only by providing the security guarantees North Korea has long been asking for and formally ending the Korean War, can the U.S. soothe North Korea's perpetual fear of an attack by the U.S. and its allies in the region.

In addition, the continuous military buildup, sporadic military clashes and constant tensions in the region have also been major contributing factors in the non-ending Cold War. The reduction of military tension on the peninsula can become the second important component of ending the Cold War here.

So far North Korea has refused to enter into any serious conventional disarmament dialogue with South Korea and the U.S. on the pretext that it faces a serious military threat from the U.S.

To augment its viewpoint, North Korea cites the joint military exercises usually held in March and August on the peninsula as a sign of U.S. preparations to ultimately attack and destroy it.

These joint military exercises have added to the mistrustful feelings between the two countries. North Korea has put its military forces on alert for years in response to joint exercises involving nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with support ships, numerous warplanes and other high tech military assets.

This fear of a possible attack has been forcing it divert its resources from civilian to military use. Thus for the sake of peace and stability, it is imperative that the joint exercises be toned down.

The impression of these military exercises should not hint at a possible war against North Korea.

Rather efforts should be made to convince North Korea that exercises are meant to strengthen joint cooperation of the two forces in a conflict zone like Afghanistan, Iraq and other places of the world. The Obama administration is strongly advised to make these exercises less threatening to North Korea as much as possible.

As part of its strategy to end isolation, North Korea has been asking for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the U.S.; unfortunately the hard-line policy of past American administrations refused to establish such relations until the nuclear issues were resolved.

The absence of diplomatic relations between these two countries is another factor in the continuation of the Cold War on the peninsula. Despite efforts to talk to each other through multilateral channels, all the attempts have failed to achieve anything substantial.

Thus establishing direct diplomatic channels with North Korea could be an important third component to ending the Cold War in the region.

Following the end of Cold War when North and South Korea were joining the United Nations, it was expected that members of rival blocks would cross-recognize the two Koreas.

While Russia and China recognized South Korea soon thereafter, the U.S. and Japan failed to reciprocate. This failure to recognize North Korea has been one of the major reasons for the hostility continuing between North Korea and the U.S.

Direct diplomatic relations can go a long way in reducing the tensions on the peninsula. Thus in the end it can be said that South Korea's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and tougher sanctions by the United Nations will likely not be sufficient to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.

These methods have been tried before and have only resulted in failure. Thus, a more long-term, all-inclusive strategy is needed, whereby the core causes of instability on the Korean Peninsula are appropriately addressed and rooted out.

Note: Article was orginally published in Korea IT Times on May 29, 2009