Until the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, ‘Juche’ was the guiding philosophy of the North Korean regime. The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) exercised complete control over all organs of the government including the armed forces. A strict chain of command ordered these forces from Kim II Sung down to the Central Military Committee (CMC) to the Korean People’s Army (KPA). However all this began to change with the death of Kim II Sung and the restructuring under Kim Jong Il, who took control of the government and the military after the death of his father.

Convinced that ‘Juche’ could no longer be the guiding principal of state policy in light of the changed domestic and international realities, Kim Jong Il adopted what has come to be known as a “military first policy.” Under this new policy he decided to exercise direct control over the military. The chain of command which was working through the KWP under his father was abolished; orders and information started flowing directly from Kim’s personal secretariat to various sections of the KPA and security forces. This gave Kim Jong Il various avenues through which to control different organs of the government and defense forces, and exert direct influence over issues of national International importance.

There have been many misconceptions and misunderstandings about the true nature and scope of the military first policy (son’gun chongchI in Korean). Many scholars and North Korea observers have argued that with this policy Kim Jong Il has elevated the position of the military to one of decision making and overall in control of the regime. However this might not be the case. Actually North Korea’s military first policy is more related to restructuring of power and influence than with decision making. Most of the power is still concentrated in the Kim Jong Il’s personnel office and secretariat, but by putting the National Defense Commission (NDC) at the center of the leadership structure Kim Jung Il has secured the support of a very important pillar of government structure. By doing this he has integrated the top military brass in the national security decision making, thus strengthening his ability to rule firmly with the support of military and security agencies.

This newly restructured NDC is providing Kim with the mechanism to integrate both external and internal issues on a common platform. Thus by brining together all different elements of the regime within the national security preview and giving it official recognition he has altered the policy followed under his father where all command and control were followed through the North Korean People Party (NKP).

Today the North Korean military enjoys a dominant position in the government’s power structure. More than 15 percent of GDP is allocated to the armed forces. (Unofficially it is said to be more than 30 percent.) The country‘s best and brightest young men and women are encouraged to opt for careers with the armed forces. The control of this elite institution over North Korean society has given Kim Jung Il unmatched power.

However, despite the prominence given to NDC under Kim Jung Il’s NKP is not entirely out sidelined in the North Korean power structure. According to recent media reports, following the health problems of Kim Jung Il the NKP has been regaining lost ground. Chang Sung-taek, who does not hold any military position and heads the administrative department of North Korea's Workers Party, is emerging as the new power force in the changing power structure of the country.
Lately Chang Sung-taek, who is also Kim Jung Il’s brother-in-law, has been seen playing a bigger role in government functions and is helping to prepare for a possible power transition. This indicates that in the event of a sudden power change in North Korea, NKP might be playing a bigger role in the country’s affairs than the North Korean military, which has been the dominant force in the recent past.
Yet there are some people who do not believe Chang will be the successor to Kim Jung Il. According to this line of thinking, it is possible he is being used as a decoy in order to promote one of Kim’s sons as the real candidate for power. (In recent media reports Kim’s eldest son Kim Jeong-nam and youngest son Kim Jong Un have been named as possible successors). Some also argue that he might be even be a military plant which does not want to attract undue attention during the transition period.
There is also the real possibility that North Korea is seeking a collective leadership of sorts consisting of Chang Sung-take and Kim Jeong-nam, using Chang and his pragmatic tendencies to smooth over any problems with the power transition. Currently no one knows for certain what is developing at the top echelon of North Korea’s power structure. What we do know is that it is getting murkier by the day and needs to be watched closely. Any violent interruption in the smooth transition of power and the power struggle among different sections of North Korean in the aftermath of Kim Jong Il will have serious consequences for the peace, security and stability of the region and the whole world.