The strategic partnership between India and South Korea is on the right track. Since the establishment of consular relations 50 years ago, both countries have made several steps in deepening this relationship, which peaked in the Strategic Partnership agreement in January 2010. This significant development is even more impressive if the different political backgrounds of India and Korea are taken into account. Although India, chairing the UN Commission to hold elections in Korea in 1947, played an important role in Korea’s independence movement, and in spite of India’s support during the Korean War for South Korea, India and South Korea did not have close friendly relations after the end of the war for quite some time.

During the Cold War era, India’s stance as leading non-alignment state, as well as her cordial relationship with the Soviet Union, was very suspicious to the strongly anti-communist Republic of Korea, and it explains why both nations, for a long time, did not develop closer relations earlier.

With the end of the Cold War, contacts intensified and relations slowly enhanced, very much fostered by India’s ‘Look East’ policy. The states’ mutual visits – by the Indian Prime Minister Rao to Korea in 1993 and South Korea’s President Kim Young-sam to India in 1996 – which led to the establishment of the “India-ROK Joint-Commission” are only two examples.

Of course, especially in the early stage, improvements concentrated on economic relations: the Republic of Korea became one of the largest Asian investor in India from the mid-90s to the end of that decade, and the bilateral trade impressively grew from US$600 million to over US$20 billion in less than 20 years (1993-2011). Moreover, economic relations are still far from having reached their full potential. They only started to grow substantially, promoted by the “Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement”, which came into effect in January 2010. Even though these developments are very remarkable it should not be forgotten that the India-Korea trade volume is still marginal compared to India’s trade volume with many other economic partners.

With the inclusion of security related issues, the bilateral relations entered a new chapter which initially led to the first-ever consultations between the Indian and Korean defense ministers in May 2007. This strategic cooperation was further upgraded in January 2010 and proclaimed through the India-ROK Joint Statement “Towards a Strategic Partnership”. It essentially promoted high-level military exchanges as well as cooperation, agreeing to conduct a “Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue” on a higher level. This has become apparent by the increasing high-level visits between India and South Korea since the new millennium, and particularly since 2010. India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and India’s President Pratibha Patil visit to South Korea in 2010 and 2012 respectively, and South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak visit to India in 2010 underline this.

To understand the importance of this development of bilateral relations between India and South Korea, the geopolitical framework of South Asia as well as East Asia should not be neglected, because it bears several consequences for the US – People’s Republic of China rivalry, as well as for India’s and South Korea’s bilateral and trilateral relations with these two powers.

Firstly, one should keep in mind that the post-Cold War situation in East Asia is characterized by a new rivalry between the US and China, in which China as an emerging power is challenging the dominant power of the system, i.e., America. For example, in the last twenty years, China has developed from the eleventh into the second biggest economy, and also the second biggest military spender in the world. China’s counterpart is the US, which, in spite of being geographically not part of East Asia, is politically as well as militarily strongly represented and interested in this region. The US reacted to China’s rise by an actual re-emphasis on this region and a foreign policy focus shift towards Asia-Pacific, last-mentioned by US President Barack Obama in a speech in November 2011. As a consequence eventually 2500 troops as well as ships, aircraft and vehicles will be stationed in Darwin, Australia, of which in early April the first batch of 180 marines had already arrived.

This is additional to the long-established US Armed Forces in Japan and Korea, which total more than 60,000 troops in East Asia. Moreover, the regional situation is not only dominated by this China-US rivalry, but becomes even more complicated by the incalculable course of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) with direct effects on South Korea, as well as the problematic relation between China and Taiwan. And finally, there is also Japan, another loyal ally to the US which, yet, out of its historical imperial past, keeps only very strained relations with China as well as South Korea.

In short, the dissolution of the Cold War order did cause many changes in East Asia to which South Korea has to respond – maybe in another way than it used to, such as simply replying on the US. Furthermore, the lack of political as well as economical multi-lateral institutionalization of relations in this region is based in the nearly unsolvable disputes between its members. As the chances for internal solutions of the region are minimal, cooperation in a much broader framework seems to be the only viable alternative.

Against this background the potential of a strategic partnership between India and South Korea should be evaluated. It could strengthen the position of both states in institutions as the East Asia Summit or the ASEAN Regional Forum. This is of great value for South Korea regarding its position vis-à-vis East Asian rivals such as Japan or China. Similarly, Indian-Korea cooperation bears importance for India in terms of her attempt to increase Indian influence in Southeast and East Asia which also coincides with India’s ‘Look East’ policy. For example, India could hope for South Korean support in an expansion of the ASEAN+3 Forum. Therefore, in terms of connecting India (as well as South Korea) with South East Asia and East Asia, a strategic cooperation could be very profitable. Besides, South Korea could also offer support to India in expanding her role in the UN Security Council.

Secondly, and much more importantly, the role of both South Korea and India bears paramount significance in regard to their relations vis-à-vis the US as well as China. South Korea, as a middle power and buffer state, is of great value as strategic partner to the US because it allows America to keep its feet in the door to China – very similarly was the US deployment of troops to Australia to strengthen its presence in “China’s backyard”. Certainly, South Korea’s alliance with the US was for many years the life insurance for South Korea, which was threatened by its much stronger brother state in the North. Therefore, the “Mutual Defense Treaty” of 1953 was a win-win situation for both the US and South Korea.

However, South Korea’s transition to a democratic state with a bustling economy in the last 25 years – nowadays ranked as the 14th largest economy in the world – is not reflected in this old-fashioned alliance, which still runs in a patron-client relationship. The change of the wartime operation control in South Korea to the ROK army in 2015 can only be regarded as a minor enhancement of South Korea’s position in this alliance. Naturally, South Korea does not seem to be interested in a shift of partnerships from the US to China, but being heavily dependent on trade with China, it also cannot afford to lose China. A deterioration of US-China relations or an intensifying of the US-China rivalry in the mid- to longterm future might endanger South Korea’s economy and trap it in political dire straits out of which any way out is very costly. A possible solution would be to build up strong strategic relations with India, as it might allow South Korea to keep its influence in Asia-Pacific while at the same time become less dependent on the US. SinoAmerican rivalries would thus affect South Korea less severely because Korea had developed a more neutral stance and freed itself out of this rivalry.

India, on the other hand, could advance its relations with the US by strengthening relations with the US ally South Korea. This would be surely one major gain for India, as India and the US cannot look back on a long history of partnership. Good relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War were one main reason for poor India-US re- lations. But even until the late 90s, things stayed relatively cool. When, in May 1998, India launched a new nuclear test, the US reacted with strong opposition, including international condemnation by the UN SC Resolution 1172. However, since then rela- tions began to make a turn for the better, resulting in the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement known as the “123 Agreement”, which was signed on October 2008.

India, being the natural counterbalance to China as the only Asian state similar in population and prospective growth, became in a short time a critical partner for the US. Obviously, the India-US relations are more equal than the US-ROK alliance and the degree of relations less high. And of course, India is not dependent upon the US as South Korea is, but good relations with the US are also for India very profitable, since both have a common interest in counterbalancing China. Because an enhancement of strategic relations with South Korea does not only positively affect relations with the US and in East Asia, but also guarantees the maintenance of an independent posture, an India-South Korea partnership offers much and bears few risks.

As the potentials of deepened strategic relations in the future are very bright, it should not be forgotten that the improvements made so far are still insufficient. Furthermore, the relations and mutual images of each nation are still partially dominated by prejudices, especially in India. According to the BBC World Polls, India’s image in South Korea improved by 25 percent between 2006 and 2010, evaluating India with 66 percent of positive and only 22 percent of negative views as the most favorable country in terms of its world influence. Additionally, the US perception of India did improve strongly (up to 56 percent in favor of India) too. On the other hand, India’s opinion of South Korea is still very negative, with only 19 percent of positive and 23 percent of negative views in 2010. This is also far below the average opinion on South Korea by other countries (36 percent positive, 31 percent negative).

Therefore, South Korea should further intensify its efforts to strengthen the strategic relations as well as to foster exchanges in the sphere of civil society to promote Korea’s image in India. The initiation of the Korea Brand-strategy under President Lee Myung-bak is definitely a good basis for tackling this problem. India as a big global player has surely more options in choosing its partners, and South Korea should not make the mistake to miss the opportunity for deepening ties with India. Contrariwise, India should not overlook South Korea’s prospects and influence in East Asia. On the one hand, the ROK is a key element in the US-China relations and thus a main link to both main actors. On the other hand, South Korea itself also bears enormous potential for India in terms of politics as well as economy. It might – through trade or technolog ical transfer – become a similar important driving force for India as it is for China and a new partner in solving international problems such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation. However, similar to the economic situation, the strategic cooperation is still in its infancy. Hence, the future for strategic relations might be very bright, but there is still a long way to go.